There’s still time to register for the 2018 Public Construction Update program scheduled for Thursday, April 26th, at Sal’s in Lawrence! (See program information and registration details in Upcoming Events.) For those registered for the event, a treasure trove of program materials will be made available on-line prior to the program. Don’t miss this annual public construction law update! Register now!
Keywords: Education, Charter school. Education Reform Act. Constitutional Law, Education, Equal protection of laws, Standing. Jurisdiction, Constitutional question, Declaratory relief. Declaratory Relief. Practice, Civil, Declaratory proceeding, Standing
In the SJC’s decision issued today in JANE DOE vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, the Court summarized its decision as follows:
“Five students who attend public schools in the city of Boston filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the Secretary of Education, the chair and members of the board of secondary and elementary education, and the Commissioner of Education (commissioner), alleging that the charter school cap under G. L. c. 71, § 89 (i), violates the education clause and the equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution because the students were not able to attend public charter schools of their choosing. A judge of that court allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of dismissal and conclude, as did the motion judge, that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief under either provision.” Justice Budd wrote: “The education clause (in the Massachusetts Constitution) provides a right for all the Commonwealth’s children to receive an adequate education, not a right to attend charter schools.” Click here for the full text of the Court’s decision.
Keywords: Real Property, Littoral property, License, Harbors. Way, Private. Trust, Public trust. Real Property, Harbors
The decision issued by the Appeals Court today focuses on “. . . whether the filling of an area of tidelands pursuant to a G. L. c. 91 license extinguished rights held by upland owners to cross that area to access the remaining tidelands and the sea. A Superior Court judge determined that the filling of certain tidelands extinguished the plaintiffs’ rights to access remaining tidelands through the end of a private way to which they were abutters. We reverse, because the c. 91 license by its terms preserved those rights.”
The case was remanded to the Superior Court. The Appeals Court concluded that the c. 91 license expressly prevents the impairment of the plaintiffs’ rights, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that they have the right to traverse Rackliffe Street to its southerly end, and ” . . . to pass from there to the mean high tide mark of Wonson’s Cove and beyond, including use of the ramp. The plaintiffs are also entitled to a suitable injunction, which should preclude the defendants from placing any structures or obstructions in Rackliffe Street or in the area bounded by the lines of Rackliffe Street extended southerly to the water, including the grassy strip.”
Click here for the text of the full opinion.
Keyword: Open Meeting Law. Municipal Corporations, Open meetings, Selectmen. Moot Question. Attorney General
In its decision issued today the SJC interpreted for the first time the meaning of “deliberation” as used in the state’s Open Meeting Law. The following is excerpted from that decision:
“The plaintiffs, all registered voters in the town of Wayland (town, brought this action in the Superior Court to challenge the procedure by which the board of selectmen of Wayland (board) conducted the 2012 performance review of the town administrator. The chair of the board had circulated to all board members, in advance of the public meeting where the town administrator’s evaluation was to take place, board members’ individual written evaluations, as well as a composite written evaluation, of the town administrator’s performance. The board made public all written evaluations after the open meeting. The issue before us is whether the board violated the Massachusetts open meeting law, G. L. c. 30A, §§ 18 and 20 (a), which generally requires public bodies to make their meetings, including “deliberations,” open to the public. . . .
We conclude further that the procedure the board followed in conducting the town administrator’s evaluation did violate the open meeting law. In making this determination, we consider, for the first time, the meaning of the open meeting law’s exemption to the definition of “[d]eliberation,” which became effective in July, 2010, that permits members of public bodies to distribute to each other “reports or documents that may be discussed at a meeting, provided that no opinion of a member is expressed.”
Click here for the full text of the SJC’s decision.
Keywords: Municipal Corporations, Municipal electric plant, Governmental immunity. Middleborough. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Statute, Construction
The Appeals Court today issued its decision in St. Laurent v. Middleborough Gas & Electric Department in which it held that the Defendant was a public employer under the Tort Claims Act. The Plaintiff had argued otherwise. The Court remanded the matter to the trial court to address whether proper presentment had been made. Click here for the full text of the decision.
Keywords: State Police. Retirement. Police, Retirement, Training program, Authority of police chief. Public Employment, Police, Retirement, Reinstatement of personnel.
The Appeals Court today issued its decision in Cournoyer v Department of State Police, in which it held that G. L. c. 22C, § 24A, does not require the State Police to develop individualized training programs for former State police troopers seeking reinstatement and could require them to complete recruit training at the State police academy. “Concluding that the statute is unambiguous and that the department may require former troopers separated for more than three years to complete recruit training, we affirm, ordering that the judgment be modified to declare the rights of the parties.” Click here for the full decision.
Keywords: Subdivision Control, Approval not required, Zoning requirements. Zoning, Enforcement, Nonconforming use or structure. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Zoning appeal, Statute of limitations. Limitations, Statute of.
Plaintiffs brought this action under G.L. c. 40A, § 7, in 2014, just shy of 10 years from the landowner’s conveyance of a “lot” shown on a 2001 ANR plan. The Court summarized: “The Goethals [landowners] subdivided a piece of land on which there was a primary house and a guesthouse, separating the two structures and leaving the guesthouse on an undersized lot. We conclude that the ten-year statute of limitations under G. L. c. 40A, § 7 ‑‑ which governs actions to compel the removal of a structure because of alleged zoning violations ‑‑ commenced at the time that the lot containing the primary house was conveyed , rather than at the endorsement of the approval not required (ANR) subdivision plan . The Plaintiff claims to have brought this action in 2014. As the Land Court judge concluded otherwise, we reverse that portion of the judgment and remand for further proceedings, while affirming the judge’s denial of the Brunos’ request for attorney’s fees and costs from the members of the board.” Click here for the full text of the decision.